In this article I seek to constructively engage Alex Anievas's seminal book that is deservedly the subject of this forum. For Anievas has become a key figure in the revival of Trotskyism in IR and his is one of the first book-length treatments of the New Trotskyist theory of the international. My critique is meant merely as a constructive effort to push his excellent scholarship further in terms of developing his non-Eurocentric approach. In the first section I argue that his book represents a giant leap forward for the New Trotskyist IR. However, in the following sections I argue that although undeniably a brave attempt nevertheless, in the last instance, Anievas falls a few steps short in realising a genuinely non-Eurocentric account of world politics. This is because while he certainly restores or brings in 'the lost theory and history of IR' that elevates class forces to a 2 central role in shaping world politics, nevertheless he fails to bring in 'the lost global theory and history of Eastern agency' that constitutes, in my view, the key ingredient of a non-Eurocentric approach to world politics. I also argue that while his anti-reductionist ontological credentials are for the most part extremely impressive, nevertheless, I argue that these are compromised in his analysis of Hitler's racism. Finally, in the conclusion I ask whether the theoretical architecture of the New Trotskyism in IR is capable of developing a non-Eurocentric approach before concluding in the affirmative with respect to its modern revisionist incarnation of which Anievas is in the vanguard.
Introduction
In recent years the theory of uneven and combined development (U&CD) advanced by the New Trotskyism in IR (NTIR) has emerged as a serious contender for the theoretical hegemony that Gramscianism has held within the Marxist IR canon since the 1990s. 1 Importantly, Alex Anievas's Capital, the State and War constitutes one of the first singleauthored book-length treatments of NTIR, which in itself makes it worthy of consideration. But the fact that the book breaks new ground makes it a compelling piece of work and a highly accomplished contribution to IR scholarship for a whole host of reasons, many of which I do not have the space to discuss.
My primary interest in Anievas' book lies in his contribution to the nonEurocentric stream of NTIR with which I have a direct interest. But it is necessary for me to specify why I have chosen this focus beyond the point that this is where my own intellectual interests lie. For I am only too well aware of the dangers of reviewing someone else's book wherein the reviewer chastises rather immodestly the author for not writing the book that the former would ideally like. This danger is important to note in this particular context, for Anievas admits candidly in the Conclusion chapter that while 'some examination of racism and ideology has been offered in this work, the linkages between culture, agency and identity in the nexus of North-South imperial relations feeding into the geopolitics of the era is in need of much further attention ' (2014: 218) .
That said, though, this statement exists in tension with the many non-Eurocentric cues found in the book and with Anievas's desire to bring in various 'non-Western vectors' -particularly the North-South and the Transatlantic. Moreover, given that his most recent interests lie in constructing a non-Eurocentric NTIR theory of the rise of European capitalism (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015) , so I feel it legitimate to interrogate the issue of non-Eurocentrism in the book under review here.
In essence, one of the problems I have is that the combination of the 'North-South vector' with the 'West-East vector' turns out to be highly uneven within this book.
Strangely while this is inserted into the case study of WWI, nevertheless, the North-South vector drops out of the two chapters on the origins of WWII. So we receive mixed messages concerning the precise scope of the spatial terrain that Anievas seeks to recover in what he terms the 'lost history and theory of IR'. But this is an anomaly that only partially concerns me. Much more importantly, while Anievas produces all manner of important and exciting cues for a non-Eurocentric approach, nevertheless, in the last 4 instance I feel that he fails to fully deliver on them. I take no joy in making this claim given that Anievas is clearly sympathetic to such an intellectual cause; and not least because I believe that Eurocentric or otherwise, this is simply a superb book, as I shall explain shortly. Accordingly, my criticisms are offered only as a constructive means of 'helping' him in his current project of developing non-Eurocentric theory.
Perhaps it might be conjectured that the present book, which is a revision of his PhD thesis, occupies a liminal/transitional juncture in Anievas's own thinking concerning the shift from a Eurocentric Marxist approach to a non-Eurocentric Marxism. For I am guessing that when he began the PhD his prime objective was to advance NTIR but that somewhere along the line he began to convert to the cause of non-Eurocentrism, by which time it was rather too late to integrate this properly within the present book. I suspect this to be the case not least because, I am proud to say, I was Anievas's external examiner of his excellent PhD thesis. And having been so impressed by his thesis, I hope I can be forgiven for providing a sympathetic critique of his book -even if he might not always perceive it as such! The article is divided into four sections, the first of which highlights some of the many strengths of the book. Section two finds that his break with Eurocentrism in the discussion of WWI is incomplete given that while East-West interactions are discussed nevertheless Western agency remains the locus of attention such that Eastern agency fails to register on Anievas' causal radar screen. The third section considers Anievas's discussion of the inter-war years and seeks to recover the lost story of Eastern agency while the fourth section interrogates his analysis of Woodrow Wilson and Adolf Hitler.
There I argue that while he is certainly sensitive to Wilson's racism nevertheless his discussion of Hitler's racism is problematic in various ways including the point that in this instance he offends his otherwise excellent non-reductionist ontological credentials.
Finally, in the conclusion I consider whether NTIR can constitute the basis for a nonEurocentric theory of world politics given that while Trotsky's work provides all manner of non-Eurocentric cues he failed to properly deliver on them. I conclude that neoTrotskyism can indeed realise such a promise and that Anievas's latest book does indeed deliver such a non-Eurocentric approach.
One Giant Leap for Marxist IR theory…
Given my claim that Anievas falls short of fully breaking with Eurocentrism the reader of this piece might very well assume that this article is primed as a wrecking operation. If so then (s)he would be sorely mistaken. I believe that this is a truly outstanding book and I find much of it to be plausible. First and foremost, the book constitutes a giant leap forward for the cause of the 'NTIR infant'. It is situated here because, to coin the phrase of one of the infant school's godfathers, Justin Rosenberg (2006 Rosenberg ( , 2008 , it develops and applies a 'social theory of the international' to the big test case of IR -that of the causes of war in general and those of the first and second world wars more specifically. This is obviously a huge terrain that Anievas explores, and most deftly does he engage it. Of perhaps principal import is the way in which Anievas brings to life the interplay of domestic social forces and international economic-cum-military pressures. This is especially relevant given that the principal danger of the 'social theory of the international' that Rosenberg and others are in search of lies with the potential omission 6 of domestic, especially class, forces. This trap, otherwise known as 'methodological internationalism' or, in Marxist parlance, 'bourgeois fetishism', is one, after all, that undid Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory in the early 1990s. But the retreat of WST within Marxism came at a price -namely the subsequent trumping of domestic class forces and the ontological downgrading of the international as a significant causal factor of world politics. So it is no small accomplishment that Anievas has developed an argument and approach which treats the articulation of internal and external causal forces in a fluid, seamless and effortless way; so much so that it all appears as entirely second nature for him. In this way, too, with respect to the wider IR literature, Anievas succeeds in taking us beyond the sterile binary of extant theories that focus either on the 'primacy of innenpolitik' or the 'primacy of aussenpolitk'.
The book also brings to life a series of international spatial 'vectors' -the NorthSouth, the Atlantic and the West-East -which are activated by the emphasis on 'uneven development', while the 'combination' aspect that proceeds subsequently enables an extremely sophisticated treatment of social development, with societies re-appearing more properly as amalgams or hybridised entities; a manoeuvre that is simultaneously a key property of non-Eurocentrism, as I explain later.
Last, but by no means the least, the old spectre of economic reductionism which haunts the minds of many a Marxist, is something that Anievas manages, for the most part, to exorcise. Whether he has succeeded in exorcising this spectre altogether ultimately matters less to me than the point that his book is about as good as it gets in dispelling economic reductionism within Marxist IR theory. His treatment of the role of ideology, of the relationship between the state and capital and of the role of geopolitics and international capitalism is a highly impressive achievement for any theory, let alone a Marxist one, and provides a breath of fresh ontological air. Indeed, in the context of NTIR, it goes further than the heroic efforts made by Alex Callinicos (2007) , whose New Trotskyist article was the subject of a Cambridge Review of International Affairs forum, in which my own response critiqued his self-proclaimed non-reductionist ontology (Hobson 2007 and . Indeed, in my view Anievas has taken the original pioneering anti-reductionist insights that were trail-blazed by Louis Althusser (1969) and Nicos Poulantzas (1973) But with the exception of his treatment of Hitler's racism, I feel that a full interrogation of Anievas's engagement with non-reductionism is mostly redundant for two reasons: first, because of his largely exceptional efforts in refuting this charge and second, because I now feel that Marxists have generally become rather too hung up with this issue. I feel pretty safe in declaring that probably no non-Marxist conventional IR theorist worries about this issue given that neorealists, constructivists and liberals all produce highly reductionist ontological accounts, with very few even feeling the need to redress this problem. I have a theory as to why this is the case but I shan't waylay the reader with such musings. In any case, the argument that states act ultimately in the interests of the general bourgeoisie and that modern world politics is in some way shaped by capitalism remain extremely important insights that render Marxist IR such a powerful theory. So why shy away from it simply because some critics use it as a means of tormenting Marxist theory not least by tarnishing it as quasi-Stalinist? I fear, therefore, that Anievas will be disappointed by my decision not to interrogate this issue though equally I hope that he will not be disappointed by my preference to interrogate his nonEurocentric credentials, given that he has certainly made a bolder attempt at going beyond Eurocentrism than have the vast majority of IR theorists. Such a lost theory and history that Anievas clearly wants to restore involves the inclusion of processes that are specific not just to Marxism but also to non-Eurocentrism. So the key question is: how successful has he been in restoring this lost account? My analysis will go through each of the empirical chapters (3 through 6) in turn selecting only those discussions that are brought into focus by my non-Eurocentric lens. My basic claim is that while Anievas has indeed carved out a fruitful and promising space for a nonEurocentric analysis of the Thirty Years' Crisis, nevertheless, in the last instance he fails to fully deliver on it. For what ultimately is missing is the inclusion of Eastern agency.
Thus while non-Western spaces and vistas are certainly opened up nevertheless they are treated as passive backdrops to the real theatre of agency -that of the European arena.
Accordingly, I want to argue that it is the 'lost global history and theory of Eastern agency' in Anievas' account (not to mention those advanced by rival theories) that needs to be restored. I shall begin with Chapter 3 -the first empirical case study -which looks at the uneven and combined developmental origins of WWI. (Hobson 2012: 165-75) . But the problem I find here is not so much with that which Anievas has said but with that which he has omitted or understated.
The major thrust of Anievas's re-reading of Wilson is undeniably important, bringing to light his deep concerns and anxieties about the rise of communism in Bolshevik Russia in particular. This is an important corrective, though it has also been marvellously brought to life by Michael Hunt (1987: ch. 4) . I guess that it should come as no surprise to learn that such a focus would be alighted upon by a Marxist! But, I argue, there is also a vitally important 'lost global theory of Eastern agency' alongside a 'lost global history and historiography of IR' that needs to be recovered here. Of what do these comprise?
The 'lost global history and historiography of IR' is one which places emphasis partly on the pre-1919 world of international theory, 3 while also noting how 1919 was indeed significant but not simply for the reasons that are conventionally accorded it.
Standard IR historiography reifies 1919 as the birth-year of the discipline and believes that it was girded from the outset by the desire to exorcise the spectre of warfare from the international system following the recent carnage of WWI. 4 We could say that Anievas has provided an alternative way of thinking about 1919: that it was important because it The irony here is that Anievas could easily have narrated this event in non-Eurocentric terms had he argued that Eastern agency led to the defeat of Italy, which then reacted back to thereby re-channel the direction of intra-European international politics.
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revealed. The legend of white invincibility was shattered, the veil of prestige that draped white civilization was torn aside, and the white world's manifold ills were laid bare for candid examination (Stoddard 1920: 171, 154 , also 12, 21).
Moreover, this fear of the non-white revolt against Western hegemony was a signature tune of inter-war liberal international theory, as I have explained elsewhere (Hobson 2012 : ch. 7), the upshot of which is my claim that 1919 was a significant, though not an originary, moment of the discipline of IR and that it was so in no insignificant part because of the threat that the East now posed to Western imperial hegemony and white racial supremacy in world politics. Eastern 'perils' constituted the paramount twin-threats that exercised Western minds in the inter-war era and indeed beyond. For the twin-issues of revolutionary class praxis and white racial supremacy were linked in the minds of many racists, especially Eugenicists.
For them a key danger to white racial vitality was the threat posed not simply by the nonwhite barbaric races but also by the 'enemy within' -the white working class. Indeed 'white racial vitality' was a euphemism for white elite vitality such that the survival of the white race lay in the hands of the superior white elite which comprised the white 'neo-aristocrat' as opposed to the white working class 'under-man' (Stoddard 1922) or the white 'sub-man' (Freeman 1921 (Stoddard 1920: 221) .
And for many Westerners the obvious link here lay in the point that it was the Bolsheviks who called for anti-colonial self-determination (rather than Wilson, since for him, selfdetermination turned out to apply only for Eastern European peoples, as Anievas also points out).
At this point my critique morphs into recovering 'the lost global theory of Eastern agency', given my perception of its omission within Anievas's account of the development of world politics in the inter-war era. At the outset it is noteworthy that the Eastern revolt against empire exhibited a wide variety of forms. It witnessed, for example, the resistance actions of the May Fourth movement in China, the March First movement in Korea, the Destour Party in Tunisia and, not least, the Indonesian Nationalist Movement. Added to this was a string of rebellions against empire, the most famous of which constituted the Amritsar rebellion against the repressive Rowlatt Acts, which saw nearly 400 Indians killed by British guns and a further 1,000 wounded. Also important were the demands made by returning Black African-Americans for real democracy in the United States that in turn prompted the Ku Klux Klan, which had been revitalised during the war, to go on the rampage in America. These events received major negative press coverage around the world and were seized upon by the Russians and Japanese in their efforts to tarnish US democracy as a sham. Indeed, the cause of everyday Western racist behaviour became a major discursive fault-line of the Cold War, certainly in its 1947 to 1965 phase, wherein the Soviets constantly chastised the USA for the racist repression of its own Negro population; a discursive weapon that was wielded to great effect (Füredi 1998) .
My point here is that while Anievas recognises some of this when discussing Wilsonian diplomacy, my problem is that he understates the issue of Eastern resistance.
Moreover, Anievas's script of world politics as it unfolds in the inter-war years in Chapters 5 and 6 pays no attention to the rise of the anti-colonial nationalist movements.
It is as if their presence in world politics had all but disappeared. Instead the vast majority of the narrative focuses on intra-European and intra-Western developments, which are treated as almost entirely devoid of influence by the non-Western world. This is surprising because their inclusion would certainly fit into Anievas's theoretical architecture -specifically via the North-South vector.
It is accordingly at this juncture where we encounter the unevenness of the treatment that the North-South vector receives in the book. For while it is clearly present in his analysis of the causes of WWI it is conspicuous for its absence in his discussion of the causes of WWII. This, once again, returns us to the Eurocentric problem whereby the European arena is treated as the real theatre of agency. This is perplexing because Japan was a formative 'actor' in WWII and, not least, because its invasion of Pearl Harbor was a key factor that brought the United States into the war and thereby changed its dynamic altogether. Moreover, while Europeans tend to equate WWII with Nazi Germany, many peoples around the world equate it with Japanese militarism. And as even Niall Ferguson Moreover, it is here where the economic-reductionist treatment of Hitler's racism intersects with the problem of representing racist-imperialism in monolithic terms. While economic and social factors are undoubtedly important for understanding Hitler's views on imperialism, it would be problematic to treat these as ontologically fundamental. For as I just noted, it was a fundamental aspect of Hitler's Eugenicist discourse that the 'dirty Jew' (as well as the 'defective' Aryan elements) should be eradicated from Germany and Europe in order to prevent the infection of the Aryan race through miscegenation that would lead to its subsequent degeneration and demise. Surely, such a sensitivity to the partial autonomy of discourse constitutes a vital component of a non-reductionist, not to mention a non-Eurocentric, approach? For, after all, the Jews remain to this day far more sensitive to the issue of racist anti-Semitism than they do the excesses of global capitalism, the linkages between these two social processes notwithstanding. All in all, then, it would be a great shame if, in admirably 'bringing in the lost history of class and capitalism' into the causes of the Thirty Years' Crisis, Anievas should throw out the racist-discursive baby with the bourgeois bathwater and thereby lose sight of the lost history of race and racism within world politics. argue, infects much of Marxist IR (Hobson 2012: ch. 10) . What, then, is Eurofetishism? Karl Marx's system of political economy was founded on the critique of 'bourgeois fetishism' -the tendency of non-Marxists to treat non-class factors as having an ontological power in their own right, divorced from the bedrock of the social relations of production that generate them. For example, 'commodity fetishism' occurs when liberal political economists assume that a commodity's value is intrinsic to it via the demand that it engenders within the market place. Rather, for Marx, a commodity is not an autonomous entity because its value is derived from the average number of hours of labour-power that are expended and exploited in producing it. In this way, Marx's method tunnels down beneath the realm of the everyday appearance of (autonomous) things in order to reveal the underlying social relations of production that produce them, thereby redirecting focus towards the class struggle within the mode of production (e.g., Marx 1867 Marx /1954 Marx 1867 Marx /1959 .
Above all, because bourgeois fetishism exorcises the ontological primacy of class struggle so the motor of development that underpins the mode of production is banished, thereby negating, or rendering impossible, its overthrow through revolution. Accordingly, bourgeois fetishism has the effect of eternalising capitalism while at the same time it was clear by the early 20 th century that the development of the more advanced societies were not destined to show the less developed 'the image of its own future' [Marx] . In this sense, the course of history had proven Marx mistaken. 'England in her day revealed the future of France, considerably less of Germany, but not in the least of Russia and not of India' (Trotsky cited in Anievas 2014: 42 international can also be negated by its constraining face, in which the backward society borrows the inventions of the advanced countries but in so doing effects a debasement of the borrower society. Either way, though, the key upshot of all this is the concept of 'amalgamation', where borrower societies become 'hybridised' amalgams comprising advanced and backward properties.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, the recognition that societies are not purely self-generating and self-constituting monoliths but are hybrid amalgams is a fundamental property not just of Trotskyism but also of non-Eurocentrism and postcolonialism. There are several links here, though they require a further twist of the non-Eurocentric screw to grasp them. One such link comprises the postcolonial emphasis on the Eastern strategy of 'mimicry', whereby Eastern societies copy but also subvert
Western civilizational ideas and in the process become 'almost the same, but not quite' (Bhabha 1994: 122; see also Bilgin 2008) . It is also important to note the rather obvious point that a non-Eurocentric approach must first of all conduct its analysis at the global level rather than that of the intra-European system -where the latter tendency finds its expression in Alexander Gerschenkron's (1962) So is a non-Eurocentric analysis in the last instance a lost cause for NTIR? I do not believe so for there are clearly some NTIR scholars who are working precisely within a non-Eurocentric framework. In this context I have already mentioned various works (Matin 2007 (Matin , 2012 Shilliam 2009 ), though I might, albeit modestly, add myself given that I advanced my non-Eurocentric approach to U&CD through a non-Marxist framework (Hobson 2011) . And even outside of IR there have been significant
Trotskyists such as C.L.R. James (1938 James ( /2001 and Marxists such as Eric Williams (1944) , who have transcended Eurocentrism, not to mention a number of other neoMarxists (e.g., Wolf 1982; Amin 1989; Abu-Lughod 1989; ). All of these works seek to subvert Eurocentrism by drawing on the broad canvass of historical sociology.
If I may be indulgent for a moment, it is worth noting that in my own piece I confronted Trotsky's Eurocentric assumptions that industrialization was pioneered in
England and that England can be treated as sui generis (Hobson 2011; see also Hobson 2004: chs. 9-11) . I did this by arguing that England was not the pioneer but was a 'late-developer' that tripped the industrial light-fantastic partly because it enjoyed the 'privilege of backwardness'. That is, through the combination process it was able to draw on the many inventions that had been pioneered by the earlier developers -the Middle East/Egypt, India and, above all, China -in order to make the final breakthrough into modernity. In other words, the uneven and combined developmental process can run from East to West. Added to this were the many imperial sites of exploitation that England engaged throughout the world, with Black African slavery, Chinese and Indian indentured labour, together with the vast array of countries from which the English extracted crucial raw materials, all contributing to enable English industrialization. In this way, I was able to retrieve the 'lost global history and theory of development/Eastern agency', thereby elevating the experience of one country into a thoroughly global context.
I mention my own analysis here because it works on a similar canvass to that which Anievas and his co-author Kerem Nişancioğlu have developed in their excellent book on the rise of the West (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015) . Thus while Trotsky provided various cues for a non-Eurocentric approach but failed to properly deliver on them, nevertheless it is perfectly possible to deploy his well-known concepts of U&CD/amalgams in a genuinely global context in order to deliver NTIR to the promised non-Eurocentric intellectual land. While I do not believe that Anievas quite managed such a feat in the book under review here, I believe that he has undoubtedly succeeded in his most recent book (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015) . All in all, though, for Anievas's non-Eurocentric efforts I say 'two cheers for Capital, the State and War' and for the book
